The EU and India have established the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), a bilateral forum to advance their partnership through collaboration in digital governance, green and clean energy technologies, resilient value chains, trade, and investment. The Council was formed in response to rising great-power competition and a desire on both sides to strengthen their respective strategic autonomies, and it has the potential to have a significant impact on the EU’s ambitions in the political, economic, and technological spheres.
In an era of increasing great-power competition, the EU and India seek to strengthen their respective strategic autonomies. Ten months after its announcement in April 2022, Brussels and New Delhi launched the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), emphasising their shared commitment to prioritise their partnership through technology. a strategic engagement in trade and technology. Three working groups on digital governance and connectivity, green and clean energy technologies, and resilient value chains, trade, and investment are part of the bilateral forum.
The EU-India TTC creates a new avenue for cooperation, which brings with it a number of challenges and opportunities. At a time when global technology governance is being shaped through ad hoc coalitions and dialogue platforms – but not yet through international organisations, with the exception to some extent of the ITU, the UN agency devoted to ICT governance-, this mechanism is the second of its kind initiated by the EU, the first being the EU-US TTC. It adds to the growing list of regional initiatives.Indian Textile Industry Witnessing A Positive Development Among the initiatives the EU is launching to address the impact of technology on security, economic(s), and values are the Digital Partnerships with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore, the Joint Commitment to Digital Transformation in the EU-Africa Joint Vision for 2030, and the upcoming EU-LAC Digital Alliance. It reverts to the goals envisioned by the first-ever approach to EU digital diplomacy, which was released only six months ago.
The TTC is not the first institutionalised platform in India, either. The Quad Initiative, comprised of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, is the primary multilateral group addressing the Indo-Pacific strategic orientation of trade and technology. Furthermore, the Biden Administration has recently launched a number of collaboration initiatives, such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
Intelligence, 5G wireless networks, and semiconductors are all examples of this. The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies is the United States’ latest attempt to forge alliances and counter China.
China’s role in the EU-India TTC
The China factor explains the EU’s desire to work with partners bilaterally rather than trilaterally or multilaterally. So far, the work of the EU-US TTC has primarily focused on information sharing, joint mapping, defining best practises, identifying risks, and exploring options for closer cooperation. One of the main US goals at the outset was to use the TTC as a forum for dialogue on a shared perspective on China, whereas the TTC is not about China for the EU.
This is why the EU has joined. a new phase of bilateral trade and technology cooperation with India. The key underlying motivation for rekindled cooperation between the two is the mirror effect of Sino-Russian alignment: while the EU seeks to reduce its reliance on China (albeit without an anti-China impulse), India seeks to reduce its reliance on Russia and China.
The COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the structural competition between the United States and China have pushed the EU to view the world through a geopolitical lens, particularly in terms of trade, and it is now applying a more realist(ic) assessment of weaponised interdependence. The EU’s open strategic autonomy reflects a shift in the thinking that underpins European policies. That is why we are witnessing it. The EU is arming itself with a growing toolbox to combat economic distortions and security disruptions to supply chains and strategic technologies from China, among other things.
On the other hand, while working to reduce its military reliance on Russia, India has not yet condemned the invasion of Ukraine in overtly explicit terms. However, with China posing a military threat on its borders and an unwelcome military reliance on Russia, New Delhi is not in the best of positions. Such a predicament only adds to India’s desire to increase its engagement with the EU.
Given the general trend of reducing reliance on China in critical sectors, India has conducted a number of technology tests. Since at least 2020, the country has been subjected to crackdowns. It has either banned Chinese apps and services or subjected Chinese manufacturers to investigations by India’s Enforcement Directorate, which has seized bank accounts and charged numerous companies with tax evasion. Section 69 of the Indian Information Technology Act empowers the Indian central government to block access to any domain or app deemed to be a threat to national security by invoking emergency powers.
Furthermore, as a result of US sanctions and tighter export control regimes on Chinese semiconductors and other critical technologies, India has emerged as an alternative location for multinational corporations such as Apple and Samsung seeking to diversify their supply chains away from China. India has been investing in its domestic technology sector in order to Build its own economic and security statecraft with government assistance and public-private partnerships in frontier technology development.
Possibilities and the future
In general, Europe remains unaware of the threat China poses to India, as well as the dynamics of Sino-Indian relations. The more channels of cooperation there are with India, the better the EU understands the Indian position and the opportunities available by engaging more broadly in the Indo-Pacific region.
Furthermore, different attitudes and positions exist across the EU regarding how to approach China, technology, and trade policy from a security and geopolitical standpoint. The Netherlands’ potential decision to join the United States’ semiconductor export controls on China, along with Japan, demonstrates the extent to which which the EU as a bloc must agree on common positions on critical issues. This will be critical for the EU-India TTC’s first and third working groups, with the former focusing on areas of mutual interest like AI, 5G/6G, high performance and quantum computing, semiconductors, cloud systems, and cybersecurity, and the latter on supply chain resilience, access to critical components, and trade barrier and global trade challenge resolution.
The TTC elevates the debate over stronger EU-India relations to a new level, where the concept of strategic autonomy in a rapidly volatile geopolitical environment takes on transcendental significance for both sides in the coming years. They will work to improve their strategic autonomy and economic resilience in light of decoupling narratives that alter the global economic system and highlight a growing strategic alignment.
